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THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
ORIGINAL INTENT? 
Charles A. Lofgren* 
The Attorney General of the United States has called for a "ju-
risprudence of original intention." In response, Justice Brennan de-
cries "facile historicism." 1 Whichever way the debate goes in its 
current phase, judges will continue to invoke original intent, legal 
scholars will evaluate the resulting judicial handiwork, and histori-
ans will criticize everyone's answers. But the basic issue will per-
sist: what is the proper role for original intent in constitutional 
interpretation? 
The issue may be considered on its own terms. This is the ap-
proach taken by Professor H. Jefferson Powell in an article that has 
attracted significant attention. What, Powell asks, was "the original 
understanding of original intent"?2 In this article, I unabashedly 
appropriate Powell's central question. My purpose is to offer an-
other reading of major chunks of the evidence that Professor Powell 
himself cites, although in the following pages I occasionally stray to 
other materials as well. 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to observe that asking 
about the interpretive status of original intent implicates another 
issue: whose intent qualifies as the "original" intent? Without hav-
ing systematically counted instances, I strongly sense that the dis-
putants in the current fray overwhelmingly focus on "framer 
intent" to the exclusion of "ratifier intent."3 To be sure, the empha-
• Roy P. Crocker Professor of American Politics and History, Claremont McKenna 
College, and member of the Graduate Faculty in History of the Claremont Colleges. 
I. E. Meese, Speech to American Bar Association, July 9, 1985, reprinted in 2 BENCH-
MARK I (1986); W. Brennan, Text and Teaching Symposium on the Constitution of the 
United States: Contemporary Ratification 4 (October 12, 1985) (printed text available at 
Georgetown University). 
2. Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 
(1985). On the article's reception, see, e.g., R. DwoRKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 364, 450 n.9 
(1986); Dworkin, The Press on Trial, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 26, 1987, at 34 n.ll. 
3. Not least in reinforcing my thinking in this regard was the occasion of reviewing 
David Currie's encyclopedic account of the Constitution's first century in the Supreme Court. 
See Lofgren, Book Review, 4 CONST. COMM. 177, 183-84 & nn.l6-18 (1987). If Currie's 
book exemplifies the priority given to "framer intent" within what may be called technical 
constitutional scholarship, Michael Kammen's sweeping survey of American constitutional-
ism offers at least suggestive evidence that similarly it is the framing, not the ratification, 
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sis is not always left unexplained. After conceding that "the inten-
tion of the ratifiers, not the Framers, is in principle decisive," Henry 
P. Monaghan has remarked that "the difficulties of ascertaining the 
intent of the ratifiers leaves little choice but to accept the intent of 
the Framers as a fair reflection of it. "4 Sometimes, too, the label 
"framer" is used in a broad sense. When Justice Rehnquist spoke in 
1976 about "the framers" and about "reading the record of the 
Founding Fathers' debates in Philadelphia," he at least briefly men-
tioned the ratification debates.s Critics of a jurisprudence of origi-
nal intention have also noted the ratifiers' role. Justice Brennan did 
so in order to underscore the difficulty of determining an original 
intent.6 Paul Brest lumps the framers and ratifiers together under 
the label of "ratifiers," and then employs the collective term in the 
course of attacking "originalism" and "intentionalism. "7 
In truth, the questions of original intent's interpretive status 
and the identity of the originators are closely intertwined. Justice 
Brennan's remark indicates one connection: ambiguity concerning 
the identity of the originators lessens the force of arguments based 
on their understandings and expectations. Another consideration is 
that equating original intent exclusively or primarily with framer 
intent (or, alternatively, with ratifier intent), or merging framer in-
tent and ratifier intent, may adversely affect the interpretive status 
of original intent, depending on whether one form of intent proves 
an easier target than the other. The close connection between the 
two issues is especially apparent when one asks about the original 
understanding of original intent. Who were the originators whose 
understandings about original intent are of interest? What might 
seem to be a subsidiary issue-the originators' identity-thus 
emerges as an integral part of the overall problem. 
A second preliminary involves word usage. "Intent" is not the 
term that I as a historian (or, I suspect, most historians) would have 
chosen to use in the context of the present debate. "Understand-
ing" or "expectation" (or the respective plurals) might better de-
which has generally caught the nation's attention. See M. KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT 
WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986). 
4. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 n.l30 (1981). 
5. See Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 694, 697, 
699 (1976). 
6. See W. Brennan, supra note I, at 4. Professor Jack N. Rakove, a leading historian 
of the 1780s and a close student of James Madison, has used Justice Brennan's remark to 
reiterate the same point. On balance Rakove, too, dismisses ratifier intent. See Rakove, Mr. 
Meese, Meet Mr. Madison, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1986, at 77, 79 & passim, which I 
discuss further infra, text accompanying note 122. 
7. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 
204, 214 & passim (1980). 
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scribe the subject of interest, as the title of Professor Powell's article 
itself suggests. But "intent" has emerged as a term of legal art, and 
so I use it (though not invariably) where I might not otherwise. 
Finally, a preview and preemptive clarification: I argue that 
although the originators rejected the use of framer intent, they did 
not thereby envisage that constitutional interpretation would ex-
clude consideration of original intent. Instead, they were clearly 
hospitable to the use of original intent in the sense of ratifier intent, 
which is the original intent in a constitutional sense.s In bold out-
line, this is not far from Professor Powell's conclusion; but in im-
portant respects he either obscures or distorts the answer. 9 In any 
event, as a historian dabbling in a present-day controversy I fully 
appreciate his disclaimer: "I am . . . unconcerned in this Article 
with what contemporary interpreters should do ... . "w Yet, just as 
Professor Powell admits that his conclusions carry implications for 
the current debate, so perhaps do mine. 
I. FRAMERS, RA TIFIERS, AND FRAMER INTENT 
The members of the Philadelphia Convention were silent about 
how they expected the Constitution to be interpreted. Noting the 
silence, Professor Powell contends that they assumed their handi-
work would be construed according to then-prevalent common-law 
canons of statutory interpretation. The common-law tradition, 
Powell demonstrates, allowed interpreters to go beyond literal 
words in order to clarify ambiguity, resolve apparent contradic-
tions, cover unforeseen circumstances, and the like, all with the goal 
of effectuating broad purposes. With respect to statutory interpre-
tation specifically, it permitted reference to "intent," but in a sense 
which was quite different from that employed by modern "inten-
tionalists." Rather than resorting to legislative history, the com-
mon-law courts inferred intent from the text itself, taken against the 
statute's common-law background and its on-going judicial applica-
tion. In twentieth century terms, common-law judges employed 
"objective" or "constructive" intent rather than "subjective" or 
"historical" intent.II 
8. Cf Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. COMM. 57, 58-59 (1987) (dis-
cussing "preconstitutional rules"). 
9. In other respects, I find his discussion highly informative, in particular his explica-
tion of the major pre-existing interpretive traditions available to Americans of the late 1780s. 
See Powell, supra note 2, at 888-901. Powell's mistake, I believe, is to give too little weight to 
how the newness of the constitutional settlement of 1787-88 opened the way for and indeed 
called for new interpretive approaches. 
10. ld. at 886. 
II. /d. at 895-904. Powell also explores the differences between common-law ap-
proaches to different kinds of documents, finding resort to subjective intent acceptable in 
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The extant records of the Philadelphia debates contain no ex-
plicit remarks on what may be called the framers' "interpretive in-
tent." Professor Powell infers, however, that the framers assumed 
that the Constitution would be interpreted exclusively according to 
common-law canons. He relies on their attempts to refine the Con-
stitution's language. These, he argues, reveal a realization that the 
instrument's precise wording would matter, just as in the case of 
statutes. In the course of several exchanges, the framers also recog-
nized that interpretation could occur through construction. 
Whether such evidence warrants the inference of exclusivity is 
problematical. For one thing, Professor Powell's reading of some of 
his sources is doubtful, 12 although the result, if not particularly re-
assuring, is not positively harmful to his argument. More telling, a 
desire for clarity in language is not antithetical to recognition that 
future interpreters might resort to subjective or historical intent to 
clarify any remaining obscurities. The delegates' concern about the 
scope of a ban on ex post facto laws indicates that they realized their 
own intentions would not necessarily control future interpreta-
tionsD but that hardly clinches the point. Also, if I understand it 
correctly, a part of Professor Powell's argument has a circular qual-
ity. The framers' failure to endorse explicitly the use of subjective 
construing wills, and such resort becoming superficially acceptable regarding contracts to-
ward the end of the eighteenth century. But the framers, he contends, "clearly assumed that 
future interpreters would adhere to then-prevalent methods of statutory construction." /d. at 
905. 
12. Regarding attempts to eliminate vagueness as indicating a commitment to common-
law methods of interpretation, two of the episodes Powell cites (id. at 903 n.88) seem to me to 
reflect more a concern that the "vague" language in question was anything but vague in its 
diminution of state powers, which was precisely why some delegates supported and others 
opposed it. In any event, the episodes occurred while the Convention was initially reviewing 
the Virginia Plan-that is, at a time when everyone realized the plan was only a general 
statement which would need fleshing out if it proved to be the Convention's preferred ap-
proach. See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 53-54 (M. Farrand 
rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter RECORDS] (May 31, on granting "Legislative power in all cases to 
which the State Legislatures were individually incompetent"); id. at 164-68 (June 8, on giving 
the national Legislature "authority to negative all [state] Laws which they shd. Judge to be 
improper"). In another instance, Powell finds the Convention debating a provision for "im-
peachment and removal of President in case of 'disability' " (Powell, supra note 2, at 903 
n.88), whereas the phrase in question referred to "disability to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office" as a phenomenon separate from impeachment and removal. See 2 
RECORDS supra, at 427 (Aug. 27, debating the section); 2 id. at 186 (Aug. 6, report of the 
Committee of Detail). Powell also gives more significance to the phrase "distinctive form of 
collecting the mind" than its context supports. Compare Powell, supra note 2, at 903, text 
associated with note 91, with I RECORDS supra, at 254-55 (June 16, remarks of Oliver Ells-
worth). Here and later I cite Farrand's compilation, while Powell cites E. H. Hunt's 1893 
edition of Madison's Notes. I have cross-checked the pertinent references. 
13. See Powell, supra note 2, at 904 & n.93. Uncertain whether their wording accu-
rately embodied their intentions, the delegates sought clarification from Blackstone's Com-
mentaries. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 12, at 448-49, 617 (Aug. 29, Sept. 14). 
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intent, he seems to say, shows that they accepted common-law 
approaches to construction, which in turn indicates that they re-
jected subjective intent as a guide to subsequent constitutional 
interpretation.t4 
Finally, a somewhat different conclusion from Powell's can be 
squeezed from one bit of evidence that he (like others) relies on.ts 
The episode in question is the Convention's decision to keep its 
journals secret. Professor Powell comments that "there is no indi-
cation that [the framers] expected or intended future interpreters to 
refer to any extratextual intentions revealed in the convention's 
secretly conducted debates."t6 The only related comments in 
Madison's notes are these: 
Mr. King suggested that the Journals of the Convention should be either de-
stroyed, or deposited in the custody of the President [of the Convention]. He 
thought if suffered to be made public, a bad use would be made of them by those 
who would wish to prevent the adoption of the Constitution[.) 
Mr. Wilson prefered [sic) the second expedient. [H)e had at one time liked the 
first best; but as false suggestions may be propagated it should not be made impossi-
ble to contradict them(.] 
The Convention then voted, ten states against one, to entrust the 
journals to the Convention's president, George Washington, and, 
after a query by Washington, further resolved (unanimously) that 
Washington should hold the journals "subject to the order of Con-
gress, if ever formed under the Constitution."t7 
This episode indicates that the delegates intended that the jour-
nals not be made public during the ratification debates. They prob-
ably feared that publication would politically complicate the task of 
gaining the requisite approval by state conventions. (Perhaps they 
surmised that general knowledge of the disagreements that emerged 
during the Philadelphia meeting would lead to questions about the 
wisdom of various provisions.) They may also have feared that 
knowledge of the Convention's debates (or at least of its motions 
and votes, which is about all the journals contain) would influence 
interpretations of the meaning of the completed document during 
the ratification process, although this is not an obvious gloss on 
King's and Wilson's remarks. Whether the framers thought it im-
portant to keep the journals secret from post-ratification interpret-
ers is even less certain from this scrap of evidence. But grant that 
the debate and decision to entrust the journals to General Washing-
ton show an intent to keep their content from entering into future 
14. See Powell, supra note 2, at 903-04. 
15. !d. at 903-04 (text associated with notes 91-93). 
16. !d. at 903. 
17. 2 RECORDS, supra note 12, at 648 (Sept. 17). 
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interpretations of the Constitution. This strongly hints that the del-
egates feared that if the journals were published, they could affect 
subsequent interpretation. Put differently, the delegates understood 
that even if common-law hermeneutics eschewed the use of subjec-
tive intent and legislative history in statutory interpretation, Ameri-
cans might still resort to such sources in interpreting the 
Constitution.Is It thus becomes problematic to say that the dele-
gates had no expectations that future interpreters would turn to 
"any extratextual intentions revealed in the convention's secretly 
conducted debates." 
A solid reason nonetheless exists for concluding that the fram-
ers intended that the Convention's proceedings should not enter 
into future interpretation. But the reason does not run against the 
use of ratifier intent. 
The original Virginia Plan, submitted by Edmund Randolph 
on May 29, provided for ratification by state conventions "expressly 
chosen by the people, to consider & decide" upon the Constitu-
tion.I9 This arrangement was included in the final document in ar-
ticle VII, but not without debate over the alternative of ratification 
by state legislatures. In part the decision turned on the expectation 
that conventions chosen specifically to consider the Constitution 
were more likely than state legislatures to approve the document. 
More important, legislative ratification would give the Constitution 
only treaty status-that is, morally binding, but legally subject 
within individual states to subsequent legislative action.2o As 
Madison expressed it, "the most unexceptionable form" of ratifica-
tion was "by the supreme authority of the people themselves." Ru-
fus King saw "a reference to the authority of the people expressly 
delegated to [state] Conventions, as the most certain means of obvi-
ating all disputes & doubts concerning the legitimacy of the new 
Constitution .... "21 
Although the idea of a constitution drawing its legal force from 
the people may seem commonplace today, it was a relatively new 
notion in 1787. An advocate of legislative ratification, Oliver Ells-
worth, "observed that a new sett [sic] of ideas seemed to have crept 
18. A comparable conclusion comes from James Madison's later comment about his 
own intentions in keeping secret his notes, which he knew were far more detailed than the 
Convention's journals. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), 
reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 71-72 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (hereinafter 
WRITINGS]. 
19. I RECORDS, supra note 12, at 22 (May 29, Virginia Plan). 
20. See I RECORDS, supra note 12, at 122-23 (June 5); I id. at 379 (June 22); 2 id. at 88-
94 (July 23). But not everyone agreed that state conventions were more likely to ratify. See I 
id. at 335 (June 20). 
21. I RECORDS, supra note 12, at 123 (June 5, Madison); 2 id. at 92 (July 23, King). 
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in since the articles of Confederation were established. Conventions 
of the people, or with power derived expressly from the people, 
were not then thought of. "22 Ratification by conventions provided 
a way around the shoal of indivisible sovereignty, that potent 
abstraction of eighteenth century political-constitutional thought 
which had helped sink the first British Empire and threatened to 
scuttle a two-tiered governmental system in the United States. Rec-
ognition of the people as the political sovereign obviated the objec-
tion that coexisting state and central governments embodied the 
solecism of divided sovereignty, of imperium in imperio. Premised 
on popular sovereignty, convention ratification also comported with 
both the logic of the decision for independence and trends in state 
constitution making in the 178Qs.23 
During the Philadelphia Convention, explanations of this posi-
tion did not display the fullness and clarity that they soon would. 
Still, the debates in Philadelphia over ratification by state conven-
tions, when taken in the context of shifting thinking on the true 
nature of constitutional authority, provide the most persuasive basis 
for concluding that the framers themselves did not envisage framer 
intent as properly having a role in subsequent constitutional inter-
pretation. Although they were the originators of the Constitution 
in an indubitable sense, the framers recognized that they were not 
the original source of the legal authority that the instrument might 
come to possess. 
Confronted with wide-ranging public opposition when the 
Constitution came before the state ratifying conventions, its sup-
porters refined their explanations of the document's source. When 
the Antifederalists charged that the Philadelphia Convention had 
exceeded its powers in elaborating a dangerous new compact be-
tween rulers and the ruled, Federalists responded that the Conven-
tion had simply proposed a constitution. The instrument would 
become binding only when it received the approbation of the peo-
ple. Defending the Constitution in Pennsylvania in December 1787, 
James Wilson explained: 
[T]he late Convention have done nothing beyond their powers. The fact is, they 
have exercised no power at all. And in point of validity, this Constitution proposed 
by them for the government of the United States, claims no more than a production 
of the same nature would claim, flowing from a private pen. It is laid before the 
citizens of the United States, unfettered by restraint; it is laid before them to be 
judged by the natural, civil, and political rights of men. By their FIAT. it will 
become of value and authority; without it, it will never receive the character of 
22. 2 RECORDS, supra note 12, at 91 (July 23). 
23. See G. WOOD, THE CREATI0:-1 OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 306-
43, 524-36 (1969). 
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authenticity and power.24 
The following month, James Madison in The Federalist No. 39 
elaborated his partly federal-partly national analysis of the Consti-
tution, which diverged from Wilson's straightforward assignment of 
sovereignty to the people of the United States.2s Yet, in The Feder-
alist No. 40, Madison substantially agreed with Wilson on the place 
of the Philadelphia Convention itself in the constitutional process, 
writing: 
It is time now to recollect, that the powers [of the Convention] were merely advi-
sory and recommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and so under-
stood by the Convention; and that the latter have accordingly planned and 
proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more consequence than the paper on 
which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is 
addressed.26 
In mid-1788, North Carolina Federalists illustrated the pervasive-
ness of the argument. Challenged to explain how the Philadelphia 
Convention could appropriate the phrase "We, the People," Wil-
liam R. Davie, who had attended the 1787 meeting, paraphrased 
Wilson: "The act of the Convention is but a mere proposal, similar 
to the production of a private pen." "If the people approve of it," 
added Archibald Maclaine, "it becomes their act. . . . When that is 
done here, is it not the people of the state of North Carolina that do 
it, joined with the people of the other states who have adopted it?"27 
Such a defense of the Constitution again left no place for 
framer intent as an authoritative guide to interpretation. The fram-
ers assuredly gave the document its words; they did not determine 
the meaning of those words as understood by the ratifiers, by those 
people whose views were crucial to legitimating the document as 
24. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
[RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: PENNSYLVANIA]483-84 (M. Jen-
son ed. 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (Wilson's speech in the Pennsylvania 
Ratifying Convention, Dec. 4, 1787). 
25. Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 253-57 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) with 
2 DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 24, at 348-49, 555, 558 (Wilson's speeches in the 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 24, Dec. II, 1787). On Wilson's views, see gener-
ally Rossum, James Wilson and the Pyramid of Government, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: 
POLITICS, STATESMANSHIP, AND THE CONSTITUTION 62-79 (R. Rossum & G. McDowell 
eds. 1981). 
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 263-64 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
27. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 23, 25 (J. Elliot rev. ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES]. See 
generally 4 id. at 16-26 (debate in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 24, 1788). 
Although the North Carolina Convention did not ratify at this time (and the State remained 
briefly out of the Union), its debates are a good gauge of the direction Federalist arguments 
had taken over the preceding months. In the episode under discussion here, if Davies echoed 
Wilson's earlier formulation, Maclaine's remark better mirrored Madison's more subtle view 
of the ratification process in THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 25. 
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fundamental law. Indeed, even if the proceedings of the Philadel-
phia Convention had been available to the ratifiers, the explanations 
of the Constitution's supporters regarding the Convention's role 
would have precluded the founders, framers and ratifiers alike, from 
giving dispositive weight to the framers' intentions as an interpre-
tive guide. 
Yet the same explanations and defenses of the Constitution 
cast substantial doubt on the conclusion that the founders, as they 
refined their thinking, took their interpretive bearings solely from 
then-prevalent canons of common-law interpretation. To have done 
so would have required them to view the Constitution as, or to 
analogize it to, a conventional legal document. What became in-
creasingly apparent, however, was that the Constitution was funda-
mentally different; it was not a statute, but rather elaborated a new 
system of government which rested crucially on the sovereignty of 
the people. 
Framer intent is at best a straw man in the argument over the 
interpretive intent of the founders. Can the same be said about rati-
fier intent? 
II. THE RATIFIERS ON RATIFIER INTENT 
Comments made during the ratification proceedings, both in 
the state conventions themselves and in the accompanying public 
debate, provide a less-than-direct answer to what the Constitution's 
proponents positively understood to be guides to constitutional in-
terpretation. In surveying available clues, Professor Powell is, I 
readily concede, partly on target. 
The Federalists sought to give the instrument a reasonable con-
struction. They paid close attention to its words. They examined it 
in light of its purposes and the deficiencies it was designed to rem-
edy; they analyzed its structure and harmonized its parts. Consis-
tent with the common-law notion that meaning might flow from a 
series of decisions, Madison seemed to imply, in The Federalist No. 
37, that some aspects of the document's division of authority be-
tween the state and central governments would only be determined 
by future adjudication.2s Drawing even more attention from Pro-
fessor Powell is the attack mounted against judicial construction by 
the Antifederalist "Brutus," along with Alexander Hamilton's re-
sponse in The Federalist Nos. 78-83. According to Brutus, con-
structive interpretation of the Constitution was sure to render the 
judiciary supreme over the legislature, to extend national power 
28. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 236 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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generally, to effect "an entire subversion of the legislative, executive 
and judicial powers of the individual states," and to intimidate and 
beggar the citizenry.29 Hamilton then "offered the most coherent 
Federalist rebuttal of the arguments of 'Brutus,' " as Professor Pow-
ell accurately observes. In the process, Hamilton treated the Con-
stitution as a "quasi-statute, a command from a legal superior to 
those under its authority," open to interpretation through applica-
tion of common sense.3o 
In the remarks of both Madison and Hamilton, Professor Pow-
ell discovers the endorsement of common-law hermeneutics. The 
key passage from Madison reads as follows: "All new laws, though 
penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest 
and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less ob-
scure and equivocal, until their meanings be liquidated and ascer-
tained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications. "3t 
Powell explains that "Madison's argument, which Hamilton had 
anticipated in The Federalist No. 22, was of course a restatement in 
somewhat abstract terms of the old common law assumption, 
shared by the Philadelphia framers, that the 'intent' of any legal 
document is the product of the interpretive process and not some 
fixed meaning that the author locks into the document's text at the 
outset."32 
This seems an overstatement. Madison was not yet focusing on 
the problem of interpreting the Constitution; instead, he was pro-
viding a transition from Publius's discussion of the weaknesses of 
the Confederation and the general requirements of good govern-
ment, to the actual provisions of the document itself. The context 
of the quoted passage from Madison was a plea to Americans to 
realize the difficulty any drafters would face in committing to writ-
ing the proper delineation of federal and state jurisdiction. The pas-
sage itself says nothing about how future interpreters would give the 
Constitution its meaning.33 Contrary to Professor Powell's gloss, 
moreover, the framers in Philadelphia had not already evinced an 
exclusive commitment to common-law approaches as a guide to 
constitutional interpretation, and in fact had given some evidence 
that they positively understood that Americans would resort to sub-
29. Essays of Brutus. reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI FEDERALIST 420 (H. Storing 
ed. 1981). See id. at 417-42. 
30. Powell, supra note 2, at 909-12. 
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 236. 
32. Powell, supra note 2, at 910. 
33. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 234-37. 
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jective intent if the requisite evidence were available.34 Nor had a 
commitment to common-law approaches to constitutional interpre-
tation appeared in The Federalist No. 22.35 
Regarding Hamilton, Professor Powell finds that while re-
jecting Brutus's portrayal of the document as a plan that was sure 
to lead to tyranny, he "accepted the validity of the common law's 
hermeneutical techniques as means to discovering a document's 'in-
tent.' " In particular, in The Federalist Nos. 78-83 "[h)e steadfastly 
reiterated The Federalist's earlier claims that it was appropriate and 
necessary for the courts to 'liquidate and fix [the] meaning and op-
eration' of laws, including the Constitution."36 As explained above, 
however, the proposition that Publius had earlier advanced claims 
of this sort respecting interpretation of the Constitution needs care-
ful qualification. 
In any event, Hamilton did not specifically write in The Feder-
alist No. 78 that courts would have to "liquidate and fix [the] mean-
ing and operation" of the Constitution. The quoted phrase instead 
appears in Hamilton's discussion of the way courts deal with con-
flicting statutes. If it proved impossible to harmonize them, then 
the judges gave effect to the most recent. "But this," wrote Hamil-
ton, "is a mere rule of construction, not derived from any positive 
law, but from the nature and reason of the thing.''37 In the case of 
conflict between a law and a constitutional provision, however, 
the nature and reason of the thing indicate the converse of that rule as proper to be 
followed. They teach us that the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to the 
subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate authority; and that, accordingly, 
whenever a particular statute contravenes the constitution, it will be the duty of 
judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former. 
He had already provided the reason for the rule: "There is no posi-
tion which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a 
delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under 
34. For the Philadelphia Convention's decision to keep its journals secret, see supra 
notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
35. While surveying the weakness of the Confederation, Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST 
No. 22 explained why lack of a federal judiciary to enforce treaties created difficulties with 
foreign nations. In the process, he wrote: "The treaties of the United States(,) to have any 
force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import as far as 
respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations." !d. 
at 143, quoted in Powell, supra note 2, at 910 n.l34. He then argued that "one SUPREME 
TRIBUNAL" was necessary to avoid the problem of courts in each state rendering different 
interpretations of treaties. He gave no indication of what would guide the supreme tribunal 
in its treaty interpretations, for that was not his concern. Even less did he address the issue of 
how to interpret the Constitution. 
36. Powell, supra note 2, at 912, 910. 
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525-26 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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which it is exercised, is void."Js 
In other words, Hamilton's argument in No. 78 did not ad-
dress the question of how judges should interpret constitutional pro-
visions, but rather stressed "that where the will of the legislature 
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people 
declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the 
latter, rather than the former. They ought to regulate their deci-
sions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not 
fundamental." 39 Hamilton thus defended constitutional supremacy 
rather than judicial supremacy or judicial review. His object was to 
deflect Brutus's argument that the Constitution would produce judi-
cial supremacy through constitutional construction by the courts.40 
Hamilton did concede that the courts would necessarily have 
to determine the meaning of the Constitution. "The interpretation 
of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts," he 
wrote. "A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the 
judges as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascer-
tain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act pro-
ceeding from the legislative body."4I But he deemphasized the 
likelihood that interpretation of the Constitution would involve in-
tricate construction. The courts would declare void "all acts con-
trary to the manifest tenor of the constitution." "If there should 
happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two [that is, the 
Constitution and a law], that which has the superior obligation and 
validity ought of course to be preferred .... "42 
One might argue, of course, that a little interpretation is still 
interpretation, and that, alas, construction is construction. Hamil-
ton nonetheless rejected exclusive use of technical common-law 
rules. The pertinent text is The Federalist No. 83. There Hamilton 
described Antifederalist attacks on the Constitution's treatment of 
jury trials: 
The maxims on which [the Antifederalists] rely are of this nature: "a specifica-
tion of particulars is an exclusion of generals"; or, "the expression of one thing is 
the exclusion of another." Hence, say they, as the constitution has established the 
trial by jury in criminal cases, and is silent in respect to civil, this silence is an 
implied prohibition of trial by jury in regard to the latter. 
Countering that "[t]he rules of legal interpretation are rules of com-
38. /d. at 526. 
39. /d. at 524-25. 
40. For a similar reading of Hamilton's supposed defense of judicial review, see G. 
WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 127-50 (1981). 
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525. 
42. /d. at 524-25 (emphasis added). As to what constituted a manifest contradiction, 
Hamilton mentioned bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, "and the like." /d. at 524. 
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mon sense," Hamilton explained how reason and common sense ran 
against the Antifederalists' application of common-law rules to the 
jury trial issue. Then came a significant addendum: "Even if these 
maxims had a precise technical sense, corresponding with the ideas 
of those who employ them upon the present occasion, which how-
ever, is not the case, they would still be inapplicable to a constitu-
tion of government. In relation to such a subject, the natural and 
obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any technical rules, is the 
true criterion of construction."43 
Hamilton undoubtedly had his private views about constitu-
tional interpretation, but it was Hamilton as Publius who entered 
the public debate in the judicial numbers of The Federalist. That 
the latter Hamilton-the public Hamilton-observed a difference 
between techniques of constitutional interpretation and the ordi-
nary or technical business of courts is further underscored by juxta-
posing the defense in The Federalist No. 78 of life tenure for judges 
with the foregoing remarks from No. 83. Judges needed to "be 
bound down by strict rules and precedents"; and that, combined 
with the "voluminous code of laws [which] is one of the inconve-
niences necessarily connected with the advantages of a free govern-
ment," made life tenure necessary in order to insure the requisite 
judicial experience and expertise. But elaborate education in the 
"artificial reason" of the law, to use Sir Edward Coke's revealing 
phrase, would be superfluous in constitutional interpretation, for 
"the natural and obvious sense of [the Constitution's] provisions, 
apart from any technical rules, is the true criterion of [its] construc-
tion."44 As part of their professional training, that is, judges might 
imbibe the canons of statutory construction, which eschewed resort 
to subjective intent, as disclosed for example in legislative history; 
but by implication from Hamilton's expressed view, a key question 
in interpreting the Constitution becomes whether common sense 
and reason would direct attention to ratifier intent in order to deter-
mine the "will ... of the people declared in the Constitution."4s 
In elaborating the ratifiers' reliance on common-law hermeneu-
tics (including eschewal of subjective intent) in constitutional inter-
pretation, Professor Powell arguably misreads or overextends still 
other pieces of evidence from the ratification controversy.46 While 
it quickly becomes tedious to dissect citations, examination of sev-
eral of his sources suggests the scope of the problem. 
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 559-60 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis 
added). 
44. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529-30; THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 560. 
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525. 
46. See Powell, supra note 2, at 907 nn.ll2-16. 
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One reference is to a remark by John Jay in the New York 
Convention. Powell writes: "As John Jay explained, Federalist 
statements of the document's meaning were not products of a sus-
pect hermeneutical process; they involved 'no sophistry; no con-
struction; no false glosses, but simple inferences from the obvious 
operation of things.' "47 In fact, in the debate in question, Jay was 
not discussing the Constitution's meaning or interpretation. "I ar-
gue from plain facts," he protested, and in that he was correct, for 
he took the Constitution to mean what surely no one contested, 
namely, that it established a bicameral legislature. The point in dis-
pute was rather how the new Congress would operate, given its bi-
cameral arrangement. Jay claimed-and this was his referent in 
saying, "Here is no sophistry, no construction, no false glosses, but 
simple inferences from the obvious operation of things"-that the 
two-house Congress would turn out vastly more difficult to corrupt 
than the Confederation Congress had proved to be. 48 
Or take this description by Professor Powell of the Federalists' 
interpretive intent: "When interpretation was necessary, it would 
take place in accord with the rules of 'universal jurisprudence,' sub-
ject to correction by the amendment process provided for in article 
V."4 9 Two of the citations in the accompanying footnote are partic-
ularly troublesome. One reference is to John Steele in the North 
Carolina Convention. Antifederalists had charged that congres-
sional control over the manner of elections to the House of Repre-
sentatives would extend to setting the qualifications of voters. 
Steele countered that the clause in question had to be read in light 
of the constitutional requirement that qualifications for electors of 
congressmen correspond to the qualifications for electors of the 
most numerous branch of the state legislature. He asked, "Is it not 
a maxim of universal jurisprudence, of reason and common sense, 
that an instrument or deed of writing shall be so construed as to 
give validity to all parts of it, if it can be done without involving 
absurdity?" He added: "By construing it [the Constitution] in the 
plain, obvious way I have mentioned, all parts will be valid. "so This 
may indicate the influence of common-law canons of interpretation, 
although the reference to "universal jurisprudence" suggests a 
47. /d. at 907 (quoting in part from 2 DEBATES, supra note 27, at 285) (John Jay in the 
New York Ratifying Convention, June 23, 1788). For readers doing their own checking, it 
should be noted that Powell's citations are to the first edition of Elliot's DEBATES; I have 
used the more readily available second (revised) edition, which is paginated differently. 
48. See 2 DEBATES, supra note 27, at 284·85. 
49. Powell, supra note 2, at 907. 
50. 4 DEBATES, supra note 27, at 71. Steele went on to claim that judicial invalidation 
of laws violating the Constitution provided a check not available under the Confederation. 
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broader referent, but the comment hardly establishes a restriction 
running against resort to historical intent in appropriate cases. 
In support of the same statement, Professor Powell also cites 
comments by Edmund Randolph in Virginia. Randolph, who now 
supported ratification after flip-flopping on the issue, allowed that 
Federalist reassurances regarding the necessary-and-proper clause 
were overly sanguine. Taken alone, the clause was an ambiguous 
provision that squinted toward consolidated government at the ex-
pense of the states. Yet when viewed in context, it did not subvert 
the principle of limited government, for otherwise the enumeration 
of which it was a part would be superfluous. Randolph would have 
preferred more careful drafting, but to disapprove the Constitution 
because of a few defective parts risked "the anarchy which must 
happen if no energetic government be established." In any event, he 
conceived "no danger." The vigilance of state governments in 
choosing senators constituted one barrier. "I trust that the mem-
bers of Congress themselves will explain the ambiguous parts," he 
continued, "and if not, the states can combine in order to insist on 
amending the ambiguities. I would depend on the present actual 
feeling of the people of America, to introduce any amendment 
which may be necessary."s1 
Embedded in Randolph's remarks is a striking conclusion. To 
spot it, one must recognize that Randolph here looked to mecha-
nisms other than judicial review to insure constitutional purity. 
One of these was the amendment process. Through it, he argued, 
the Constitution guaranteed that if the ambiguities of the document 
were not resolved in accordance with "the present actual feeling of 
the people of America," then the people themselves could achieve 
that end. This was not a bad formulation of the idea of taking gui-
dance from ratifier intent, considering that the phrase itself was not 
then a term of constitutional art. At a minimum, anyway, Ran-
dolph's comments, like Steele's in North Carolina, do not indicate 
endorsement of common-law hermeneutics to the exclusion of origi-
nal intent in the sense of subjective ratifier intent. 
Finally, there is an intriguing episode that Professor Powell 
does not examine. At the beginning of the ratification process, the 
Federalists held a clear majority in the Pennsylvania Convention. 
Sensing defeat and seeking ways to salvage something from the situ-
ation, their opponents tried unsuccessfully to enter their objections 
to various provisions into the meeting's journal. One of the Feder-
alists speaking against the insertion of objections was Dr. Benjamin 
Rush, who argued that to do so would obscure and confuse the rec-
51. 3 DEBATES, supra note 27, at 463-64, 470-71. 
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ord, which was "stamped with authenticity."s2 
Like the Philadelphia Convention's decision to keep its jour-
nals at least temporarily secret, the episode is open to varying inter-
pretations. The Federalists may have feared that to publish the 
Antifederalist objections in the official journal would give them 
greater weight in other states (a view made more realistic in light of 
the Pennsylvania Antifederalists' powerful critique of the Constitu-
tion). Or they may have feared a lessening of popular attachment to 
the new government once it went into operation. These other read-
ings of the brief exchange are possible, but the debate suggests, I 
think, at least some sense on the part of the Pennsylvanians that the 
record of the ratification process might help to shape future under-
standings. As Robert Whitehill put it while arguing for inclusion of 
the reasons for negative votes, "the people at large will acknowl-
edge, with thanks, the resulting information upon a subject so im-
portant to themselves and their latest posterity." Both sides were 
saying, in effect, that contemporary explanations would tell the peo-
ple, then and later, about "the nature and tendency of the govern-
ment," to quote Whitehill again. At one level the Federalists 
agreed; they simply did not wish the wrong explanations to "derive 
from [the Convention's] countenance a stamp of authenticity," to 
use James Wilson's variation of the phrasing.sJ 
Despite the hints about ratifier intent provided by Edmund 
Randolph and the Pennsylvanians, it must be conceded that they 
remain hints. To the extent that I have examined the literature-
and I cannot claim full familiarity with the outpouring of material 
in 1787-88, which is in the process of becoming more accessible54-
the Federalists never explicitly and unambiguously stated that fu-
ture interpreters should resort to ratifier intent. At the very least, 
this reticence needs attention. 
Three interrelated reasons suggest themselves. First, there 
could be no ratifier intent until the disputants in the ratification 
controversy developed understandings about the instrument's 
meaning. Second, the pressing and primary problem was not to 
provide a basis for future interpretation or construction, but to ex-
plain how the Constitution would meet present and future needs. 
Finally, the ratifiers' endorsement of reason and common sense as 
guides made an explicit endorsement of ratifier intent redundant, 
52. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 24, at 372 (Nov. 27, 1787). See generally 
id. at 370-79. 
53. /d. at 377. 
54. See THE DocUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(work of 17 or 18 vols., plus microfiche supplements, 1976· , in progress) (pub. by State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin). 
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for the former constituted a kind of proxy for the latter. Given an 
unchanging human nature, reason and common sense would reveal 
in the the future what reason and common sense revealed in 1787-
88. Questioned about the future status of ratifier intent, one can 
imagine a puzzled Federalist exclaiming, "What? Are you hinting 
that the Constitution will not mean in the future what it says and 
what its structure implies? That's a strange position. I don't under-
stand the suggestion that we are ratifying something other than the 
system that common sense discloses to us. Yes, there may be a few 
ambiguities. Remember, though, that if the officials of the new gov-
ernment fail to give effect to what we ratifiers see in the document, 
there are correctives." Which is, of course, very nearly what some 
Federalists did say. 
The meaning of the Constitution as it was ratified corre-
sponded to its meaning for the people who gave the document its 
binding status. A truism? Perhaps. But it returns our focus to the 
obvious. It also reminds us that there is another issue to be ad-
dressed. What did the instrument's content-its general and spe-
cific provisions-mean to the ratifiers? This further issue can be 
conceived of, alternatively, as an evidentiary problem or as a prob-
lem in intellectual history. Beyond the ratification debates per se, it 
involves the accompanying public debates and the still fuller range 
of sources that shed light on how people in 1787-88 read those as-
pects of the document that the ratifiers did not explicitly address. It 
is a difficult practical problem, but it should not be confused with 
the narrower question of the interpretive intent of the ratifiers.55 
III. REFLECTED LIGHT ON THE ORIGINAL 
INTERPRETIVE INTENT 
Additional insight into views on constitutional interpretation 
in 1787-88 comes from later commentary by participants in and ob-
servers of the ratification controversy. Professor Powell surveys a 
number of useful sources in this regard. Receiving brief attention 
are the 1789 debate over the president's removal power and the con-
flict in 1791 among President Washington's executive officers over 
the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States.56 Powell 
finds some participants in the removal debate denying the legiti-
macy of any attempt to move beyond the Constitution's words, 
while others accepted interpretation through construction. What 
passes unnoticed are comments implicating historical intent, such 
55. Put differently, asking about the original understanding of original intent is only 
one aspect of deciphering the understandings and expectations of 1787-88. 
56. See Powell, supra note 2, at 913-17. 
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as the remark by Alexander White of Virginia that if the principle 
of enumerated powers "had not been successfully maintained by 
[the Constitution's] advocates in the [Virginia ratifying] convention 
... , the constitution would never have been ratified."s1 Alexander 
Hamilton's clear rejection of framer intent in his 1791 Bank opinion 
gets mentioned, but not his use therein of evidence from the ratifica-
tion process.ss 
Two other sources of reflected light on American understand-
ings in 1787-88 deserve and receive fuller attention. One is the 1796 
debate in the House of Representatives on how to interpret the 
House's role in treatymaking, "[t]he most sustained early congres-
sional discussion of constitutional hermeneutics," writes Professor 
Powell.s9 The second source is James Madison, who participated in 
the 1796 debate and commented further in later years. 
A. THE HOUSE DEBATE OF 1796 
The 1796 debate occurred when House Republicans wanted 
access to diplomatic papers before approving appropriations to im-
plement the Jay Treaty with England. At least some members on 
each side of the issue accepted the propriety of turning to the ratifi-
cation controversy as a guide to constitutional interpretation in suit-
able cases. Professor Powell relates these comments, but contends: 
This use of history was related but not identical to that of modem intentionalism. 
57. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS col. 535 (June 18, 1789) (J. Gales & W. Seaton eds. 1834). 
See also id. at cols. 474-75, 545, 547-48, 551-52 (June 16 and 18, 1789, remarks by Represen-
tatives Smith, Lee, Boudinot, and Jackson). White went on to quote the Virginia proceedings 
and to discuss the ratification process in North Carolina. 
58. Powell quotes Hamilton's attack on Jefferson's reference to the refusal by the dele-
gates in Philadelphia to grant Congress the power of incorporation. See Powell, supra note 2, 
at 915. Hamilton certainly used language at this point in his opinion that is interpretable as 
running against any use of historical intent, and concluded: 
Nothing is more common than for laws to express and effect, more or less than was 
intended. If then a power to erect a corporation, in any case, be deducible by fair 
inference from the whole or any part of the numerous provisions of the constitution 
of the United States, arguments drawn from extrinsic circumstances, regarding the 
intention of the convention, must be rejected. 
Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a National Bank, Feb. 23, 
1791, reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 248, 
258 (M. Frisch ed. 1985). Yet, in context, Hamilton closely linked his strictures against 
subjective intent to use of framer intent; and he himself later resorted to ratifier intent, 
commenting: 
It is remarkable, that the State Conventions who have most, if not all of them, 
expressed themselves nearly thus-"Congress shall not grant monopolies, or erect 
any company with exclusive advantages of commerce"; thus at the same time ex-
pressing their sense, that the power to erect trading companies or corporations, was 
inherent in Congress, & objecting to it no further, than as to the grant of exclusive 
priviledges [sic]. 
/d. at 273. 
59. Powell, supra note 2, at 917. 
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The 'contemporaneous expositions' on which ... [the members] relied were not 
confined to the debates at Philadelphia, or at the state conventions, but included the 
defenses of the Constitution published by its proponents and even the critical inter-
pretations of its opponents. 
95 
He goes on to indicate that use of extraneous sources came under 
attack, but he responds that "[r]esort to materials from the ratifica-
tion era as one species of evidence as to the Constitution's context 
was in fact only mildly innovative, although proponents of the 
House resolution strove to make it appear a flagrant violation of the 
established canons of construction."60 In fact, Professor Powell's 
exegesis of the debate in 1796 scarcely does justice to the clear evi-
dence of acceptance of ratifier intent that the debate discloses. 
Again, my focus is primarily on the evidence that he himself cites. 
William Smith, a South Carolina Federalist, was one of those 
opposing the call for papers. His argument emphasized "that the 
Treaty power was solely delegated to the PRESIDENT and Senate 
by the Constitution .... " To make the point, he stated, 
he should not confine himself to a mere recital of the words, But he should appeal to 
the general sense of the whole nation at the time the constitution was formed .... 
By referring to the contemporaneous expositions of that instrument, when the sub-
ject was viewed only in relation to the abstract power, and not to a particular 
Treaty, we should come at the truth.61 
He then reviewed evidence purportedly showing that during ratifi-
cation the Federalists defended the decision to place the treaty 
power with the president and the Senate, while their opponents had 
charged that the document unwisely excluded the House of Repre-
sentatives. His evidence included remarks in the state conventions, 
amendments proposed in the conventions, and comments in other 
meetings at the time.62 He turned, that is, to materials that reason-
ably might indicate the ratifiers' expectations and understandings. 
With respect to Smith's comments and similar statements, 
however, Professor Powell claims that "those who cited evidence 
from the ratification period almost invariably linked it with other 
expressions of constitutional opinion. "63 But observe Smith's sup-
posed qualification in this regard, as recorded by the reporter: 
"Having stated the general opinion of the public, as manifested by 
the friends as well as the enemies of the Constitution [in 1787-88], 
Mr. S[mith] said he would proceed to show that the practice of 
Congress had, from the commencement of its existence, been con-
60. /d. at 918-20. 
61. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS col. 495 (March 10, 1796) (History of Congress ed. 1849) 
(hereinafter ANNALS OF CONGRESS]. 
62. /d. at cols. 495-96. 
63. Powell, supra note 2, at 918. 
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formable to that opinion." Simply put, the remark does not run 
against or qualify use of ratifier intent, which is not surprising be-
cause Smith had just disparaged "ex post facto construction. "64 
Similarly, Federalist Theodore Sedgwick twitted James 
Madison for only recently having discovered a role for the House of 
Representatives in the treaty process. He noted Madison's silence 
on the subject during the Virginia ratification debates and inquired 
"how it happened that, if such was really the intention of the instru-
ment, that such was the meaning of the people, no man had heard 
of it until the discovery was produced by the British [Jay] Treaty. 
Strange national intention, unknown for years to every individual." 
If the proponents of the call for diplomatic papers were "right in 
their construction [of the House's role], if this was the understand-
ing of the people at the time they deliberated on and ratified the Con-
stitution, the power of the PRESIDENT and Senate of making 
Treaties, which then created the most serious deliberation and 
alarming apprehensions, was the most innocent thing in nature."65 
Sedgwick went on to quote extensively from the Virginia proceed-
ings of 1788 and then more briefly showed that interpretations by 
Congress and the Supreme Court provided corroboration.66 
So, too, agreed Benjamin Bourne, who declared that "[i]f a 
doubt existed as to what was the true construction of the Constitu-
tion, it ought to be conformed to the opinion which prevailed when 
the Constitution was adopted . . . . "67 Professor Powell indicates 
that Bourne regarded subsequent interpretations by state legisla-
tures as constitutionally authoritative, but Bourne instead turned to 
such legislative comments for evidence that the President and Sen-
ate had acted wisely in making the Jay Treaty. Only then did he 
offer the comment just quoted. In short, he maintained that the 
Treaty represented sound policy, and that if questions arose about 
constitutional powers, the understandings of 1787-88 should be 
64. 5 ANNALS OF CoNGRESS, supra note 61, at col. 496. Smith's full remark, which 
examined the implications of a proposed Antifederalist amendment in Pennsylvania that 
would have limited the force of treaties as internal law unless approved by the House of 
Representatives, ran thus: "This amendment was the most satisfactory evidence that the 
proposers of it did then believe that, without that amendment, such Treaty would be valid 
and binding, although not assented to by this House, and that they had, at that day, no idea 
that there existed in the Constitution the check which is now discovered by this ex post facto 
construction." 
65. Id. at cols. 520, 522 (March 11, 1796) (emphasis added). 
66. /d. at cols. 523-28. Sedgwick in fact came close to endorsing use of framer intent, 
which subsequently drew James Madison's ire, but his emphasis was not so much on framer 
intent per se as on framer intent as an especially valuable species of "co[n]temporaneous 
exposition." /d. at col. 523. 
67. Jd. at col. 574. 
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dispositive. 68 
Or take the comments of Uriah Tracy, which, according to 
Professor Powell, typified "the caution with which these Represen-
tatives advanced historical materials as evidence of the Constitu-
tion's meaning."69 As Powell correctly notes, Tracy explored the 
Constitution's text and Confederation practice. He then endorsed 
Benjamin Bourne's suggestion that small state jealousy contributed 
to the exclusion of the proportionally constituted House of Repre-
sentatives from the treaty process. To clinch the point, he observed: 
"If any proof could be necessary, he thought the almost unanimous 
understanding of the members of the different Conventions in the 
States, who were called to discuss the Constitution for adoption, 
was in favor of the construction he had given," which he then sum-
marized. He allowed, it is true, "that, from such debates, the real 
state of men's minds or opinions may not always be collected with 
accuracy,"1o but his use of the ratification proceedings indicates 
that he considered them in this instance to be conclusive evidence 
against the Republicans' expansive interpretation of the treaty role 
of the House. He recognized, that is, that historical intent might 
not be easily reconstructed. Where it could be determined, how-
ever, it was dispositive in the resolution of textual ambiguities.? I 
In the course of the arguments surveyed in the preceding 
paragraphs, Federalist speakers also hypothesized what the mem-
bers of the Philadelphia Convention hoped to accomplish by giving 
the treaty power its final form. William Vans Murray of Maryland 
appeared the most forthright in directing attention to the framers; 
in Professor Powell's view, therefore, he "seems to have come much 
closer to modern intentionalism."12 Vans Murray called on James 
Madison and Abraham Baldwin, who was also a delegate to the 
1787 meeting, to reveal what they surely knew about the treaty-
related proceedings in Philadelphia. In making his challenge, he 
came close to asserting that framer intent had a role in constitu-
tional interpretation. But just as the other Federalists who referred 
68. /d. Bourne had already briefly surveyed the state convention proceedings, a survey 
which he concluded with the comment: "Now ... if this was the construction of the Consti-
tution when it was adopted in the several States, would it not be a trick on the small States 
[which had equal representation in the Senate] now to construe it differently ... ?" /d. at 
cols. 572-73. 
69. Powell, supra note 2, at 918. 
70. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 61, at col. 616-17 (March 17, 1796). Professor 
Powell quotes parts of these remarks, but does not, I think, convey their full force. 
71. Powell sees Tracy's exploration of Confederation practice as further qualifying the 
weight he gave to the ratifiers' intent. See Powell, supra note 2, at 918 n.l73. It is more 
accurate to say that Tracy argued that if the text, examined in light of pre-ratification prac-
tice, proved at all ambiguous, then the understanding of the ratifiers might settle the dispute. 
72. /d. at 920. 
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to the framers made clear that they saw the understandings of the 
ratifiers as conclusive, so Vans Murray's willingness to put Madison 
and Baldwin in an embarrassing position came after he admitted 
that other speakers had completely described "the opinions that 
were entertained at [sic] the adoption of the Constitution."73 On 
balance, he saw the proceedings in Philadelphia as one more source 
of contemporaneous opinion, not dispositive, but potentially useful 
as another indication of how people possessed of common under-
standings in 1787-88 had read the document.74 
Republicans, it should come as no surprise, rejected Federalist 
conclusions regarding the limited role of the House in the treaty 
process. They did so partly by attacking the Federalists' approach 
to constitutional interpretation. Professor Powell notes a number of 
these retorts, giving special attention to those by Albert Gallatin 
and James Madison. It was Gallatin who used the phrases that 
Powell quotes when he asserts that Federalist speakers "were vigor-
ously attacked by the resolution's supporters for 'conjur[ing] up' 
such 'extraneous sources.' "7s Gallatin assuredly disparaged the op-
position's "train of arguments, drawn not from the letter or spirit of 
the Constitution, either directly or by implication, but from a vari-
73. 5 ANNALS OF CoNGRESS, supra note 61, at col. 700 (emphasis added). His full 
statement, as recorded by the reporter, is instructive: 
Other gentlemen, with whom he agreed in opinion, had rendered it unneces-
sary for him to say anything upon the opinions that were entertained at the adop-
tion of the Constitution, upon the question now before the Committee. He believed 
that, from one end of America to the other, it was taken for granted that this House 
had nothing to do in the making of Treaties, and that this power was exclusively in 
the Senate and PRESIDENT. The [other] gentlemen just up ... had placed the 
interests of the small States, in this construction, in so forcible and correct a point of 
view, that he would not say a word upon that very interesting part of the subject. 
But, of the contemporaneous opinions, that were supported in the Convention 
which framed the Constitution, he would make a remark or two. 
Jd. Vans Murray then issued his challenge to Madison and Baldwin. 
74. See id. at cols. 701-02. 
75. Powell, supra note 2, at 919. Powell states in his next sentence: "Their [the Feder-
alists'] opponents contended that the proper method of interpretation was 'to attend to and 
compare' the text's various provisions in accordance with the 'ancient' rules for 'the interpre-
tation and construction of laws or Constitutions.'" The phrase "to attend to and compare" 
also comes from Gallatin, but Gallatin made no reference to "ancient" rules; he directly 
stated the rule of construction he preferred-"that construction which would give full effect 
to all the clauses and destroy none." 5 ANNALS OF CoNGRESS, supra note 61, at col. 727 
(March 24, 1796). The later quotations within Powell's sentence come from William Lyman, 
who eight days earlier had elaborated rules for textual construction, including one "maxim" 
that he labeled "ancient." Jd. at col. 603 (March 16, 1796). Regarding his reading of the 
treaty power, Lyman also declared that "[i]t had appeared, from the extracts of publications 
of the [ratification] period, that whatever might have been the diversity of opinion in other 
respects relative to the Constitution, that, in this construction, at least, both its friends and 
opposers perfectly agreed." Jd. at col. 604. Indeed, Lyman did not reject ratifier intent, but 
only read it as pointing to conclusions different from those that the Federalists now found in 
it. 
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ety of extraneous sources," but assuredly, too, he accused no one of 
"conjur[ing] up" the sources in the sense of inventing them or call-
ing them into existence. Rather, he argued that the extraneous 
sources (which were real enough that he himself soon analyzed 
them) "had been conjured up as united in ascribing to the power of 
making Treaties the most unlimited and unbounded effect. " 76 Say-
ing that an improper meaning had been attributed to the sources is 
different from suggesting that the sources had been invented. 
Particularly noteworthy is an omission by Gallatin. It came 
after he charged that the Federalists, having failed to support their 
interpretations by reference to the law of nations and to practice in 
Great Britain and under the Articles of Confederation, "have re-
curred to the opinions of individuals, of State Conventions, and fi-
nally, of the general Convention which framed the Constitution." 
Taking direct aim at William Vans Murray, he then limited his at-
tack to the doctrine "that the opinions and constructions of those 
persons who had framed and proposed the Constitution, opinions 
given in private, constructions unknown to the people when they 
adopted the instrument, should, after a lapse of eight years, be ap-
pealed to .... "n Gallatin did not condemn the retreat to ratifier 
intent. 
Nor is the omission strange. Gallatin had already contended 
that recourse to practice in Great Britain and under the Articles 
was appropriate in interpreting the treaty clause because those were 
"the two Governments which had served as a basis and model to 
our present Constitution, which were mostly contemplated by the 
people who adopted it . ... "7s By contrast, he caricatured the Fed-
eralists as telling the people that "[they] have had a Constitution for 
eight years, and have adopted it under such impressions as must 
have resulted from the face of the instrument; but it was the design 
of those who framed it, that it should have a different construction 
from that it naturally bears .... " Through analogy, he distin-
guished ratifier intent from framer intent: "The intention of a Leg-
islature who pass a law may perhaps, though with caution, be 
resorted to, in order to explain or construe the law; but would any 
person recur to the intention, opinion, and private construction of 
the clerk who might have been employed to draft the bill?" Moving 
beyond analogy, he explained directly: 
In the present case, the gentlemen who formed the general Convention, however 
respectable, entitled as they were to the thanks and gratitude of their country for 
76. /d. at col. 727 (March 24, 1796). 
77. /d. at cols. 733-34. 
78. /d. at col. 733 (emphasis added). 
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their services in general, and especially on that important occasion, were not of 
those who made, who passed the instrument; they only drew it and proposed it. 
The people and the State Conventions who ratified[,] who adopted the instrument, 
are alone parties to it, and their intentions alone might, with any degree of propri-
ety, be resorted to. 79 
It is true that Gallatin next questioned resort to the ratification 
controversy, but his concerns were evidentiary. In the debate at 
hand, the Federalists had referred both to Antifederalist remarks 
and to amendments proposed during the process. He found these to 
be a poor guide to pertinent understandings in 1787-88, maintaining 
instead that only the views of the Constitution's supporters should 
carry weight.so He then offered his own gloss on several state de-
bates, concluding: "After such pointed contemporaneous exposi-
tions of the true meaning and spirit of the Constitution, would it 
still be asserted, that the opinion now expressed [by the Republi-
cans] were a new-fangled doctrine ... ?"st 
Before turning to James Madison, three of Professor Powell's 
lesser Republican witnesses from the 1796 debate deserve mention. 
One unequivocally did reject ratifier intent. "As to the construction 
generally received when the Constitution was adopted," Edward 
Livingston 
did not conceive it to be conclusive, even if admitted to be contrary to what now 
(the Republicans] contended for; because he believed we were now as capable at 
least of determining the true meaning of (the Constitution] as the [State] Conven-
tions were: they were called in haste, they were heated by party, and many adopted 
it from expediency, without having fully debated the several articles.82 
After quoting Livingston, Professor Powell focuses on two 
other disputants from 1796 when he comments that "[t]he House, it 
was argued, must seek 'the intrinsic meaning of the Constitution ... 
from the words of it,'ts2 while recognizing that the text was un-
avoidably ambiguous on many issues and that its framers had antic-
ipated that those questions would 'be settled by practice or by 
amendments.'ts3"s3 The first internal quotation, identified by Pow-
ell's footnote 182, is from a speech by William Branch Giles. What 
Giles actually said, at least as eventually compiled into the Annals 
of Congress, was this: 
79. /d. at col. 734. 
80. See id. at cols. 734-35. 
81. /d. at cols. 735-37. 
82. /d. at col. 635 (March 18, 1796). Livingston cautioned that if one were to look to 
the ratification debates, then it was the remarks of the Constitution's supporters, not its oppo-
nents, that were conclusive. 
83. Powell, supra note 2, at 919 (emphasis added; the ellipsis and internal footnote 
numbers are Powell's). 
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Having examined the objections to the [constitutional) construction contended for 
by the friends of the motion [that is, the motion that the President produce papers], 
drawn from collateral sources, he should tum his attention next, he said, to the 
intrinsic meaning of the Constitution. He would attempt to interpret the Constitu-
tion from the words of it. 84 
101 
Compare this with Professor Powell's statement, which uses a 
"must" and inserts an ellipsis to connect portions of two sentences. 
Powell's combination mangles Giles's meaning by suggesting that 
he rejected collateral or extrinsic sources, which he did not do. 
The citation for the remainder of Powell's sentence (in footnote 
183) is to a speech in which Abraham Baldwin conceded that the 
framers probably knew 
that some objects were left a little ambiguous and uncertain. It was a great thing to 
get so many difficult subjects definitely settled at once. If they could all be agreed 
in, it would compact the Government. The few that were left a little unsettled 
might, without any great risk, be settled by practice or by amendments in the pro-
gress of Government. 85 
Baldwin misjudged the Constitution's clarity, but that is slight war-
rant for Powell to paraphrase the congressman's "some," "a little," 
and "few" as "many." In fact, contrary to Powell's implication, 
Baldwin did not contrast (a) adjustment through practice and 
amendment with (b) clarification by reference to extrinsic sources 
from 1787-88. Instead, he soon said that "[h]e was willing to allow 
due force" to "the reasons of members of the Convention, the pro-
posed amendments of several States [during the ratification pro-
ceedings), &c," even though he detected an undue reliance on these 
materials in the instant debate. Such evidence, he explained, "was 
not of sufficient force to be a ground of absolute certainty that the 
thing [that is, the House's role in the treaty process) is definitely 
settled," particularly because the 1796 debate marked the first sus-
tained analysis of the question, not excluding the ratification de-
bates.86 In sum, Baldwin carefully qualified his position. 
Politics obviously shaped the debate in 1796, which may raise 
suspicions about conclusions drawn from it. Yet politics provides 
the context for most comments on constitutional issues; if all such 
remarks were ignored, the record would indeed be barren. (Even 
the confidential debates in Philadelphia were assuredly political.) 
The key is to evaluate the evidence while keeping context in mind. 
From the standpoint of deciphering the original understanding of 
original intent, one feature of the exchanges over the Jay Treaty is 
remarkable. Both Federalists and Republicans accepted use of orig-
84. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 61, at col. 505 (March II, 1796). 
85. !d. at col. 537 (March 14, 1796) (emphasis added). 
86. !d. at cols. 538-39. 
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inal intent in the form of ratifier intent. More precisely, to use 
terms pertinent to Professor Powell's article, they accepted subjec-
tive or historical ratifier intent and sought out the actual expecta-
tions and understandings of the ratifiers. 
B. JAMES MADISON'S VIEWS 
And then there is James Madison. It may be partly because of 
the hold of framer intent on constitutional scholars and judges that 
Madison tops just about everyone's list of founders. Once framer 
intent is discounted, Madison's notes and recollections of the pro-
ceedings in Philadelphia have less importance in reconstructing the 
original understanding of original intent. Beyond being a leader in 
the Philadelphia Convention, however, Madison participated in the 
ratification controversy and was a careful observer of-and 
reflective thinker about-the entire founding period. As a result, 
just as Professor Powell is on solid ground in surveying the 1796 
debate in Congress (if not always in the conclusions he draws from 
it), so he is unassailable for paying substantial attention to Madison. 
As he remarks, "Although [Madison] would have been quick to dis-
tinguish his personal opinions from the public meaning of the Con-
stitution, the coherent interpretive theory Madison expressed in 
speeches and letters over many years has special value for anyone 
seeking to discern the 'interpretive intent' underlying the 
Constitution. "s7 
Not least, Madison contributed to the 1796 debate. After the 
House finally resolved to request papers relating to the Jay Treaty 
negotiations, George Washington refused to comply. In addition to 
prudential reasons, the President relied on the Constitution. "Hav-
ing been a member of the General Convention, and knowing the 
principles on which the Constitution was formed," he found that 
the document excluded the House from treatymaking. His view, he 
argued, accorded with practice and "with the opinions entertained 
by the State Conventions, when they were deliberating on the Con-
stitution .... " "If other proofs than these, and the plain letter of 
the Constitution itself, be necessary to ascertain the point under 
consideration," he added, "they may be found in the Journals of the 
General Convention, which I have deposited in the office of the De-
partment of State."ss 
Washington's foray into interpretation triggered a response 
87. Powell, supra note 2, at 935. 
88. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 61, at co1s. 761-62 (Washington's Message of 
March 30, 1796). In summarizing Washington's avowed constitutional authorities, Professor 
Powell omits the reference to the state ratification debates. See Powell, supra note 2, at 921. 
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from Madison, who argued along several1ines.s9 One was toques-
tion the President's interpretation of the deliberations of the Phila-
delphia Convention. Madison concluded, though, that whatever 
their meaning, "the sense of that body could never be regarded as 
the oracular guide in expounding the Constitituion." 
As the instrument came from them [he continued] it was nothing more than the 
draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it 
by the voice of the people, speaking through the several State Conventions. If we 
were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the 
instrument, we must look for it, not in the General Convention, which proposed, 
but in the State Conventions, which accepted and ratified the Constitution.90 
Professor Powell remarks that from 1796 onwards, Madison 
was "remarkably consistent" in his views on interpretation,9' and so 
he was.92 In 1821, for example, he wrote Thomas Ritchie: 
As a guide in expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the de-
bates and incidental decisions of the [Philadelphia] Convention can have no author-
itative character. However desirable it be that they should be preserved as a 
gratification to the laudable curiosity felt by every people to trace the origin and 
progress of their political Institutions, & as a source perhaps of some lights on the 
Science of Govt.[,] the legitimate meaning of the Instrument must be derived from 
the text itself; or if a key is to be sought elsewhere, it must be, not in the opinions of 
the body which planned & proposed the Constitution, but in the sense attached to it 
by the people in their respective State Conventions where it reed. all the Authority 
which it possesses.93 
This position accorded with Madison's earlier explanation, during 
the ratification controversy, of the respective roles of the Philadel-
phia Convention and the ratifying conventions. 
Professor Powell concedes that "Madison thought it proper ... 
to consult the direct expressions of state intention available in the 
89. See 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 61, at cols. 774-76 (April 6, 1796). 
90. /d. at col. 776. 
91. Powell, supra note 2, at 939 n.278. 
92. However, to say that Madison was remarkably consistent is not to say that he was 
entirely consistent. In 1827, for example, he endorsed use of the journals of the Philadelphia 
Convention, although his wording was careful enough to allow the inference that he only 
meant that they would support a particular interpretation, not that they were entitled to 
dispositive weight. See Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (March 22, 1827), 
reprinted in 9 WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 284, 286. For another example, see Letter from 
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823), reprinted in 9 id. at 137, 142. So far as I have 
determined, the closest Madison came to directly explaining such usages was in 1830, when 
he described the Philadelphia Convention "as [only] presumptive evidence of the general 
understanding at the time of the language used." Letter from Madison to M. L. Hurlbert 
(May 1830), reprinted in 9 id. at 370, 372; see infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
93. Letter from Madison to Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS, supra 
note 18, at 71, 72. Accord, Letter from Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), reprinted in 9 
id. at 370, 372; letter from Madison to Nicholas P. Trist (Dec. 1831), reprinted in 9 id. at 471, 
477. 
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resolutions of the ratifying conventions. "94 The force of the conces-
sion is mitigated, however, by the fact that in quoting Madison in 
Congress in 1796 and Madison's letter to Ritchie in 1821, Powell 
omits the sentences in which Madison explicitly endorsed ratifier 
intent.9s In a footnote, Powell does quote a comparable endorse-
ment, but merely to support his unexceptionable contention that 
Madison rejected framer intent; he does not draw out Madison's 
clear meaning regarding ratifier intent.96 
In much the same vein, Professor Powell states that Madison 
found the ratification debates "to be of real yet limited value" and 
explains that 
evidentiary problems with the surviving records and Madison's insistence on distin-
guishing the binding public intention of the state from the private opinions of any 
individual or group of individuals, including those gathered at a state convention, 
led him to conclude that the state debates could bear no more than indirect and 
corroborative witness to the meaning of the Constitution.97 
Again, however, the cited materials raise questions about Powell's 
conclusion. To Jonathan Elliot, Madison allowed that the extant 
records of the proceedings might be "defective ... in some respects 
& inaccurate in others," but he found them to be "highly interesting 
in a political as well as Historical view" and had only encourage-
ment for Elliot's plan to publish them. In the letter, he did not 
conclude that the interpretive value of the ratification debates was 
only indirect and corroborative. 98 
Nor does such a conclusion reasonably flow from the cited let-
ter to Andrew Stevenson, in which Madison discussed the meaning 
of the terms "common defence" and "general welfare." Here 
Madison demonstrated, as he did on other occasions, that he, too, 
could probe the journals of the Philadelphia Convention; but he put 
both the journals and the ratification debates in perspective when he 
commented: "Passing from this view of the sense in which the 
terms common defence & general welfare were used by the Framers 
of the Constitution, let us look for that in which they must have 
been understood by the Conventions, or rather by the people, who 
thro' their Conventions, accepted & ratified it."99 At the very least, 
this letter does not suggest that Madison had "conclude[d] that the 
94. Powell, supra note 2, at 937. 
95. See id. at 938, 936, 921. 
96. See id. at 939 n.278 (quoting Letter from Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), 
reprinted in 9 WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 370, 372). 
97. Powell, supra note 2, at 937-38. 
98. Letter from Madison to Jonathan Elliot (Feb. 14, 1827), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS, 
supra note 18, at 270, 271. 
99. Letter from Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), reprinted in 9 id. at 
411, 421. 
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state debates could bear no more than indirect and corroborative 
witness to the meaning of the Constitution." 
As for "contemporaneous expositions of the document by its 
supporters," the Madison described by Professor Powell accorded 
them "some value, but he cautioned that such statements were to be 
regarded strictly as private opinions, useful chiefly in shedding light 
upon the meaning of words and phrases that the fluidity of language 
might gradually change over time." 100 In fact, a letter from 
Madison to Henry Lee that supposedly contains or implies this 
qualification does not. The relevant passage reads as follows: 
I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the Constitution 
was accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone it [that is, the Constitu-
tion as construed) is the legitimate Constitution. And if that be not the guide in 
expounding it, there can be no security for a consistent and stable, more than for a 
faithful[,) exercise of its powers. If the meaning of the text be sought in the change-
able meaning of the words composing it, it is evident that the shape and attributes 
of the Government must partake of the changes to which the words and phrases of 
all living language are constantly subject.IO I 
Nor does such a qualification appear in the cited letters to Andrew 
Stevenson and Nicholas P. Trist.I02 
Rather than resort to historical or subjective intent, Professor 
Powell's Madison "consistently thought that 'usus,' the exposition 
of the Constitution provided by actual governmental practice and 
100. Powell, supra note 2, at 938. 
101. Letter from Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS, supra 
note 18, at 190, 191. That Madison disapproved such a change is evident in his immediately 
following comments. See id. at 191-92. 
102. Madison commended Stevenson's "industry" in "search[ing] for a key to the sense 
of the Constitution, where alone the true one can be found; in the proceedings of the Conven-
tion, the co[n)temporary expositions, and above all in the ratifying Conventions of the 
States." Letter from Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Mar. 25, 1826), reprinted in 3 LEITERS 
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON ... , 520, 521-22 (1884) (hereinafter LEITERS). 
(If anything remarkable emerges from the letter, it is not doubts about resorting to the public 
expositions of 1787-88, but Madison's mention of the Philadelphia Convention.) As for the 
Trist letter, Powell in his parenthetical footnote elaboration correctly explains it as recogniz-
ing that the "Constitution [was] affected by the imprecision and mutability of language." 
Powell, supra note 2, at 938 n.293. The letter says nothing, however, about the proper role 
for ratifier intent or anything else about how properly to interpret the document. To be sure, 
one phrase might be pulled out of context to suggest the propriety of settling word meaning 
through "a long course of application," but context indicates that Madison, without discuss-
ing proper interpretation, only recognized the Constitution unavoidably used some terms 
"the precise import of which has not been settled by a long course of application." (Reading 
the full sentence suggests in fact that he probably meant to write "had" rather than "has," 
which further underscores that he was only describing the document.) He recognized, too, 
that changes in word meaning had produced debates over the Constitution's meaning, a de-
velopment he clearly disapproved. If anything, the reasonable inference from Madison's re-
marks to Trist on this occasion is that he would have welcomed clarification from the debates 
in 1787-88; but in its terms the letter simply does not take up the issue. See Letter from 
Madison to Nicholas P. Trist (Mar. 2, 1827), reprinted in 3 LEITERS, supra, at 565. 
106 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 5:77 
judicial precedents, could 'settle its meaning and the intention of its 
authors.' "1o3 But Madison himself complicated his gloss on usus 
when, discussing the extent of Congress's power over foreign com-
merce in an unposted letter to Professor Davis, he wrote: 
After all, we must be guided ... by the intention of those who framed, or, rather, 
who adopted the Constitution; and must decide that intention by the meaning at-
tached to the terms by the "usus" which is the arbitrium, the jus and the norma 
loquendi, a rule as applicable to phrases as to single words. It need scarcely to be 
observed that, according to this rule, the intention, if ascertained by contemporane-
ous interpretation and continued practice, could not be overruled by any latter 
[later?) meaning put on the phrase, however warranted by the grammatical rules of 
construction[,] were these at variance with it.104 
Regarding the interpretive problem at hand-that is, the extent of 
the commerce power-Madison surveyed difficulties regarding for-
eign trade in the 1780s, as well as contemporary comment on them 
and the Constitution's solutions for them. "That the power of regu-
lating foreign commerce was expected to be given to, and used by, 
Congress in favour of domestic manufactures," he explained, "may 
be seen in the debates in the Convention of Massachusetts."10s He 
then quoted extensively from deliberations in the first Congress, 
which he followed with the observation: 
It deserves particular attention, that the Congress which first met contained 
sixteen members, eight of them in the House of Representatives, fresh from the 
Convention which framed the Constitution, and a considerable number who had 
been members of the State Conventions which had adopted it, taken as well from 
the party which opposed as from those who had espoused its adoption. 106 
To Professor Davis, Madison also cited "a continued use of it 
[the commerce power as a basis for protection of domestic manufac-
tures] for a period of forty years, with the express sanction of the 
executive and judicial departments, and with the positive concur-
rence or manifest acquiescence of the State authorities and of the 
people at large, with a very limited exception during a few late 
years." 101 After reviewing several pertinent examples, Madison 
concluded: "If all these authoritative interpretations of the Consti-
tution on a particular point cannot settle its meaning and the inten-
tion of its authors, we can never have a stable and known 
Constitution." 1os 
In his letter to Professor Davis, Madison may have partly used 
103. Powell, supra note 2, at 939. 
104. Letter from Madison to Professor Davis (ca. 1832, not posted), reprinted in 4 LET-
TERS, supra note 102, at 232, 242. 
105. Id. at 244. 
106. Id. at 247. 
107. Id. at 246-47. 
108. ld. at 249. 
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the term "intention" in the sense of a meaning assigned to a docu-
ment by later interpreters, as Professor Powell argues. If so, he did 
not conceive of the pertinent usus as simply "the exposition of the 
Constitution provided by actual governmental practice and judicial 
precedents," as Professor Powell parenthetically defines the word, 
citing, with questionable regard for context, two other Madison let-
ters.I09 Madison himself turned to practice and precedent only for 
additional proof of the correctness of his interpretation of the for-
eign commerce power; and the most reasonable interpretation of his 
purpose in adducing such further evidence is that he saw practice 
and precedent as confirming his reading of original intent. Con-
gressmen, executive officers, and judges, that is, had found the same 
intent that Madison did. 
At minimum, Madison explicitly rejected modification of the 
Constitution's meaning through new constructions, lamenting that 
"[s]ome of the terms of the Federal Constitution have already un-
dergone perceptible deviations from their original import." Despite 
"the authority of the precedents regularly continued for thirty or 
forty years," some still argued "that the true character of a political 
system might not be disclosed even within such a period." But he 
cautioned that "this would not disprove the intention of those who 
made the Constitution. It would show only that it was made liable 
to abuses not foreseen nor soon to appear; and that it ought to be 
amended, but by the authority which made it, not by the authority 
subordinate to it .... " 110 In short, if the document as interpreted 
according to the intentions of those who made it an authoritative 
instrument ceased to be adequate, then formal amendment, not 
novel construction, was the remedy. This remedy had to be used 
109. Powell, supra note 2, at 939. In one of the cited letters, Madison remarked: "I have 
always supposed that the meaning of a law, and for a like reason, of a Constitution, so far as it 
depends on Judicial interpretation, was to result from a course of particular decisions, and not 
these from a previous and abstract comment on the subject." Madison to Spencer Roane 
(Sept. 2, 1819), reprinted in 8 WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 447 (emphasis added). The qualifi-
cation here italicized indicates a more restricted view than that conveyed by Powell's phrase. 
Also diminishing the force of the letter to Judge Roane as authority for the phrase in question 
is the fact that in it Madison was arguing against aspects of a judicial precedent. In the other 
letter cited as support for Powell's definition of "usus," Madison accepted the practical neces-
sity of federal judicial review in federal-state disputes, which is also a rather narrow assertion. 
See Letter from Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Sept. 7, 1829), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS, supra 
note 18, at 346. Professor Powell's footnote explanations for each letter acknowledge their 
restricted compass. 
110. Letter from Madison to Professor Davis, reprinted in 4 LETTERS, supra note 102, at 
232, 249. Madison's use herein of "made" is a little puzzling, but unless he was remarkably 
inconsistent with his views otherwise, he meant the term in the sense of "gave it force." Note 
the comment by his colleague Albert Gallatin, in 1796, that the framers "were not those who 
made, who passed the instrument; they only drew and proposed it." 5 ANNALS OF CoN-
GRESS, supra note 61, at 734 (Mar. 24, 1796) (emphasis added). 
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sparingly, however, and only upon due consideration.''' 
Undeterred, Professor Powell finds Madison's position on the 
power of Congress to incorporate the Bank of the United States to 
be an example of his acceptance of practice and judicial precedent 
in opposition to historical intent.m As President, Madison signed 
into law the Second Bank of the United States twenty-five years 
after opposing the First Bank on constitutional grounds. Dodging 
the charge of inconsistency, he later claimed that whatever his pri-
vate view of the meaning of the Constitution, it was superceded by 
"a course of authoritative expositions sufficiently deliberate, uni-
form, and settled" as to be "an evidence of the public will necessar-
ily overruling individual opinions."l13 Of course, when he 
approved the Bank Bill in 1816, Madison had before him only legis-
lative precedent. Later, when he questioned Andrew Jackson's veto 
of the rechartering of the Second B. U.S., he again focused on legis-
lative interpretation of the Constitution. The need for stability, he 
explained, required that, in all but the most exceptional instances, 
legislators should be guided by legislative precedent in interpreting 
the Constitution in the same way that judges are guided by prece-
dent in the interpretation of laws. He defended this view, using 
analogy and unequivocal statements, on two grounds. First, he ar-
gued that stability was essential to the rule of law; second, and ar-
guably more fundamental, he maintained that a consistent line of 
legislative precedent established a presumption that the sovereign 
people approved the interpretation. With evident reference to the 
president's participation in the legislative process through the veto 
power, Madison thought that interposition of personal conclusions 
was particularly suspect "when no prospect existed of a change of 
construction by the public or its agents."l14 
With respect to the Bank issue, Madison conceded to Nicholas 
P. Trist in 1831 that "a course of authoritative, deliberate, and con-
tinued decisions" could serve to "fix the interpretation of a law,'' 
but the context of his remarks again indicates that he had legislative 
decisions in mind, decisions which were "an evidence of the Public 
II I. See Letter from Madison to John M. Patton (March 24, 1834), reprinted in 9 WRIT-
INGS, supra note I 8, at 534, 536. 
112. See Powell, supra note 2, at 939-42. 
I 13. Letter from Madison to C. E. Haynes (Feb. 25, I 831 ), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS, 
supra note 18, at 442, 443. Accord, Letter from Madison to the Marquis de LaFayette (Nov. 
1826), reprinted in 3 LETTERS, supra note 102, at 538, 542; Letter from Madison to Nicholas 
P. Trist (Dec. 1831), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 471, 476-77. See also Letter 
from Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 17, 1825), reprinted in 3 LETTERS, supra note 102, 
at 483. 
114. See Letter from Madison to C.J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in 4 LETTERS, 
supra note 102, at I 83, I 85. 
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Judgment, necessarily superseding individual opinions." It was fal-
lacious, moreover, to confound "a question whether precedents 
could expound a Constitution, with a question whether they could 
alter a Const[itution]." It is significant, too, that he added: 
Another error has been in ascribing to the intention of the Convention which 
formed the Constitution, an undue ascendancy in expounding it. Apan from the 
difficulty of verifying that intention(,] it is clear, that if the meaning of the Constitu-
tion is to be sought out of itself, it is not in the proceedings of the Body that pro-
posed it, but in those of the State Conventions which gave it all the validity & 
authority it possesses. 115 
A comparable conclusion about the relative priority of ratifier 
intent emerges from an earlier letter involving the Bank issue. 
Writing to Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia after the decision in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, Madison attacked John Marshall's gratui-
tously broad construction of congressional authority. He admitted 
that words sometimes failed the founders, observing: 
It could not but happen, and was foreseen at the binh of the Constitution, that 
difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms 
& phrases necessarily used in such a chaner; more especially those which divide 
legislation between the General & local Governments; and that it might require a 
regular course of practice to liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them. 
The clause italicized here, which Powell excises from his rendition 
of the quotation, qualifies it. This qualification, however, is less sig-
nificant than the stronger qualification provided both by general 
context and by the two sentences that immediately followed (which 
Powell also omits). In them, Madison explained further: 
But it was anticipated I believe by few if any of the friends of the Constitution, that 
a rule of construction would be introduced as broad & as pliant as what has oc-
curred. And those who recollect, and still more those who shared in what passed in 
the State Conventions, thro' which the people ratified the Constitution, with respect 
to the extent of the powers vested in Congress, cannot easily be persuaded that the 
avowal of such rule would not have prevented its ratification.116 
Overall it is difficult to find Madison conceding that the origi-
nal "interpretive intent" gave construction, including construction 
based on usus, a priority over resort to ratifier intent. Instead, he 
invoked ratifier intent in opposition to construction: original his-
tory (as it may be labeled) put limits on adaptation. He accepted 
115. Letter from Madison to Nicholas P. Trist (Dec. 1831), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS, 
supra note 18, at 471, 477. 
116. Letter from Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), reprinted in 8 WRITINGS, 
supra note 18 at 447, 450-51. Over a century later, Justice Sutherland offered a remarkably 
similar argument: "It is safe to say that if, when the Constitution was under consideration, it 
had been thought that any such danger lurked behind its plain words, it would never have 
been ratified." Caner v. Caner Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 296 (1936). 
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that as a private individual he lacked the authority to substitute his 
interpretations for the meanings accepted by the sovereign public as 
time passed; but that was an issue of who could authoritatively ex-
plain the document, not of how it should be done. 
Writing to M.L. Hurlbert in 1830, Madison satisfactorily sum-
marized his views on interpretation. The letter needs quoting at 
length: 
[T]he real measure of the powers meant to be granted to Congress by the [Philadel-
phia] Convention, as I understood and [still] believe, is to be sought in the [Consti-
tution's] specifications to be expounded indeed nor with the strictness applied to an 
ordinary statu[t]e by a Court of Law; not on the other hand with a latitude that 
under the name of means for carrying into execution a limited Government, would 
transform it into a Government without limits. 
But whatever respect may be thought due to the intention of the Convention, 
which prepared & proposed the Constitution, as presumptive evidence of the general 
understanding at the time of the language used, it must be kept in mind that the only 
authoritative intentions were those of the people of the States, as expressed thro' the 
Conventions which ratified the Constitution. 
That in a Constitution, so new, and so complicated, there should be occasional 
difficulties & differences in the practical expositions of it, can surprize [sic] no one; 
and this must continue to be the case, as happens to new laws on complex subjects, 
until a course of practice of sufficient uniformity and duration to carry with it the 
public sanction shall settle doubtful or contested meanings. 
As there are legal rules for interpreting laws, there must be analogous rules for 
interpreting const[itutio]ns and among the obvious and just guides to the 
Const[itutio]n of the U.S. may be mentioned-
1. The evils & defects for curing which the Constitution was called for & 
introduced. 
2. The comments prevailing at the time it was adopted. 
3. The early, deliberate & and continued practice under the Constitution, as 
preferable to constructions adapted on the spur of occasions, and subject to the 
vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies.117 
This summary, along with his other remarks on the subject (in-
cluding his own occasional use of the views of the framers), suggests 
a capsule restatement of Madison's views. For him, the essential 
guidelines to interpretation were these: 
(!)The text, viewed always with an eye on the dictates of limited government; 
(2) The deliberations in Philadelphia, insofar as they offer insight into the way 
contemporaries not present, and not privy to the debates, would generally have 
understood the final language of the text; 
(3) The commentaries and debates accompanying ratification, and most espe-
cially (but by no means exclusively) those within the state conventions; and 
(4) Early and continued practice, particularly as a check on (but not an invari-
able barrier to) subsequent reinterpretation. 
And what might be the exceptional occasion that would war-
117. Letter from Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS, supra 
note 18, at 370, 371-72 (emphasis added). 
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rant subsequent reinterpretation at variance with the early and con-
tinued practice embraced within the fourth guideline? Presumably 
such a shift might come about when there existed a widespread, 
sustained, and hence persuasive conviction that reinterpretation was 
necessary in order to adhere even more faithfully to the first three 
guidelines, and especially in order to observe the "authoritative in-
tentions ... of the people of the States, as expressed thro' the Con-
ventions which ratified the Constitution." If practice at variance 
with an original understanding nonetheless continued, surviving 
with the long-term acquiescence of Congress, this then evidenced 
the will of the sovereign people. 
IV. THE ORIGINAL INTERPRETIVE INTENT 
Madison understood the theoretical base of the new constitu-
tional order and appreciated both the logic of the ratification pro-
cess and the force of related Federalist defenses of the Philadelphia 
Convention against the charge of usurpation. He accordingly con-
demned resort to framer intent. So too did most of his contempo-
raries when they seriously weighed its authority. Viewed from the 
perspective of the founding period, framer intent is easily dis-
missed-a bogus issue which is best forgotten by both "intentional-
ists" and their critics. Yet it was not subjective or historical intent 
itself that was troublesome to the founders. The reasons running 
against framer intent supported the use of ratifier intent. 
The issue of the status of subjective or historical ratifier intent 
for the founders should not be confounded with the question of the 
extent to which such intent soon provided a guide to constitutional 
interpretation, in comparison with familiar common-law hermeneu-
tics. In constitutional disputes during the first years of the new gov-
ernment, arguments based on construction of the document eclipsed 
reliance on subjective intent. Thus in Chisholm v. Georgia the 
Supreme Court drew on treatise writers and contextual analysis in 
reading the judicial article to allow suits by individuals against 
states, ignoring Publius's fairly clear assurance to the contrary.IIs 
As another example, both Hamilton and Jefferson emphasized con-
struction according to common-law rules in their exchange over the 
Bank of the United States. 
Nonetheless, resolution of the issue of extent may be more 
complex. For example, aside from the possibility that the historical 
118. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), discussed in Powell, supra 
note 2, at 921-23; THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548-49 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
Cj 3 DEBATES, supra note 27, at 533, 555-56 (remarks of James Madison and John Marshall 
in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 20, 1788). 
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intent relevant to the Chisholm case was not so readily determined 
as is now commonly assumed, a higher authority soon corrected the 
Court regarding the amenability of states to suit, much in keeping 
with Edmund Randolph's explanation in 1788 of the recourse avail-
able if officials lost sight of "the present actual feelings of the people 
of America." II 9 Then, too, Hamilton himself used ratifier intent in 
his bank opinion, in a matter-of-course fashion, notwithstanding 
the opinion's strong condemnation of resort to framer intent.I2o 
And in 1796, when the ratification debates provided arguably ger-
mane evidence on the role of the House of Representatives in 
treatymaking, disputants on both sides accepted the legitimacy of 
turning to the debates, however much they disagreed about what 
specifically qualified as evidence and about what it meant. Happily, 
however, the issue of extent need not be resolved here. 
There is also the issue raised by Edward Livingston when he 
charged that the ratifiers acted with haste and felt the goad of 
party.121 As a modem student of Madison asks, "Why should we 
assume that those who merely ratified the Constitution grasped its 
meaning better than those who wrote it-or those who have since 
seen how it works in practice?"I22 The answer from an "intention-
alist" perspective is that whether the ratifiers better grasped the in-
strument's meaning is beside the point; rather, how the ratifiers 
understood the Constitution, and what they expected from it, de-
fines its meaning. The act of ratifying cannot be dismissed with the 
adverb "merely." 
The more fundamental point with respect to "the original un-
derstanding of original intent" is that by jettisoning framer intent, 
the founders did not throw constitutional interpretation exclusively 
into the grip of readily available common-law approaches, including 
use of constructive intent. If modem intentionalists focus on the 
framers, as Professor Powell alleges with considerable accuracy, 
they have scant theoretical or historical grounds for their history-
based hermeneutics. When correctly reconstructed and understood, 
119. See C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 27-40 
( 1972) (reviewing the state ratification debates and arguing that Antifederalists claimed and 
some Federalists admitted that the judicial article made the states amenable to suits by indi-
viduals); U.S. Const., amend. XI; 3 DEBATES, supra note 27, at 471 (Randolph in the Vir-
ginia Ratifying Convention). See supra text accompanying note 51. Of course, to the extent 
that the ratifiers had recognized the amenability of states to suit, it becomes difficult to see the 
eleventh amendment as an attempt to restore the original intention. See generally C. JACOBS, 
supra, at 67-74. 
120. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
121. 5 ANNALS oF CONGRESS, supra note 61, at col. 635 (quoted supra, text accompany-
ing note 82). 
122. Rakove, supra note 6, at 79 (emphasis added). 
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however, the original understanding of original intent most emphat-
ically does not rule out a resort to the understandings and expecta-
tions of the ratifiers in 1787-88, or to the range of materials that 
may illuminate their views. Indeed, it is not too much to say that at 
least some of the founders saw the ratifiers' historical or subjective 
intent as a check on constructions which cut loose from the original 
understandings of the sovereign people. 
